DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

| MEMORANDUM FOR: | J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director |
|------------------------|---|
| FROM: | W. White, Pantex Site Representative |
| SUBJECT: | Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 6, 2002 |

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on annual leave Monday and was on site for the remainder of the week. A. Matteucci was on site Tuesday through Thursday to observe operations and participate in site-specific training.

<u>Transportation Safety Analysis Report (SAR)</u>: NNSA completed its readiness assessment of the implementation of the first of four groups of safety basis controls from the first phase of the Transportation SAR. This group of controls includes eighteen administrative controls for transportation of full-up nuclear explosive assemblies. These controls include the walker/spotter program, speed limits for transportation, restrictions on transportation during inclement weather, parking locations, allowable convoy routes, etc. Implementation of the remaining three groups of controls from the first phase of the Transportation SAR is to be accomplished over the next twelve months. These remaining controls include both administrative controls and engineered design features. Controls for transportation of partial nuclear explosive assemblies will be identified in the second phase of the Transportation SAR.

The NNSA readiness assessment identified one pre-start finding and three post-start findings. The pre-start finding involved an inadequate level of knowledge with respect to locations where transportation of nuclear explosives is prohibited. [II.A]

<u>Sitewide Safety Analysis Report:</u> Last week, OASO issued its safety evaluation report (SER) approving the second package of the Sitewide SAR. This package established and defined a program for the control of common equipment used in nuclear explosive areas but not evaluated as facility or process equipment. This package also expanded the lightning protection analysis to address lightning sensitive components other than nuclear explosives, addressed certain aircraft crash scenarios, and evaluated the potential hazard to nuclear operations from on-site and off-site chemical release scenarios.

The OASO SER contained five pre-start conditions of approval, which must be addressed prior to implementation of the SAR package. The SER also noted sixteen post-start conditions of approval for which BWXT must develop a plan of action within sixty days. OASO declined to approval the chemical hazards analysis presented in the SAR, as the program credited for controlling the hazards does not yet exist. OASO requested that BWXT identify the interim measures currently in place to control chemical hazards and defend their adequacy pending implementation of the proposed chemical control program.

Also of note, the OASO approval letter forwarding the SER notes that the parallel development process being used to upgrade or create the safety basis modules required under 10 CFR 830 has "created the need to perform a final check to assure all the documents are properly integrated." OASO directed BWXT to develop a consolidated SAR by June 1, 2003. [II.A]

<u>W79 Staging</u>: Earlier this week, BWXT issued an unusual occurrence report following discovery that a facility used to stage W79 units had not been evaluated in the programmatic combustible loading disposition document. In addition, the facility was not authorized for staging of W79 units in the Master Authorization Agreement. The W79 units were moved to an approved facility. [II.A]